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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The fol lowing i s s u e s are presented in t h i s appeal: 
1 . Whether defendant's counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e by 
f a i l i n g t o object and by agreeing t o a supplemental ins truc t ion 
containing an Allen charge. 
2 . Whether defendant i s procedurally barred from 
review of h i s claim that the t r i a l court erred by giving the 
Allen charge. 
3 . Whether the g iv ing of the Allen charge coerced the 
jury t o reach a v e r d i c t and was a manifest i n j u s t i c e requiring 
reversal of t h i s case . 
4 . Whether the evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o support the 
j u r y 1 s v e r d i c t . 
5 . Whether the t r i a l court erred by permitting the 
testimony of an unavailable w i tness , concerning the same f a c t s 
given a t the preliminary hearingr to be read i n t o the record when 
defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the wi tness at the 
preliminary hearing. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 20629 
- v - : 
JERRY JOE MEDINA, : P r i o r i t y No. 2 
Defendant -Appel lan t . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, J e r r y Joe Medina, was charged wi th c r imina l 
homicide, murder i n the second degree , a f i r s t degree f e lony , i n 
v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953) as amended. 
Defendant was convic ted of c r imina l homicide, murder i n 
t h e second degree , in a j u r y t r i a l held February 2 6 , 2 7 , 28 and 
March 1 , 1985, in t he Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court , i n and for 
S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah, t h e Honorable J . Dennis 
F r e d e r i c k , Judge , p r e s i d i n g , Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Freder ick on March 2 5 , 1985, t o t h e Utah S t a t e P r i son t o a term 
of not l e s s than f i v e y e a r s and which may be for l i f e . The Court 
a l s o ordered defendant t o complete a substance abuse program and 
pay r e s t i t u t i o n in an amount determined by t h e Board of Pardons . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On t h e n igh t of Sa turday , March 3 1 , 1984, George 
Givens , t he v i c t i m , a l so known a s Greg Givens , (R. 691) , met 
Rickey Myers, in downtown S a l t Lake C i t y . Myers was walking i n 
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the c i t y , s i g h t - s e e i n g (R. 3 8 1 ) . He had arrived in S a l t Lake 
City the previous Wednesday (R. 380) or Thursday (R. 504) . 
Givens t o l d Myers of a nearby party that he was going t o and 
asked Myers to come along (R. 381) . The two walked from the 
downtown area to Myers1 truck (R. 3 8 3 ) , which was parked near the 
Holiday Inn at Redwood Road and North Temple (R. 458) . 
When they arrived a t the party, which was in a duplex 
(R. 385) , they discovered there was another party next door (R. 
387) . Mike O'Mara l i v e d in one ha l f of the duplex where one 
party was being held (R. 199-200) . This party was attended by 
high school aged youth (R. 387) . The other party, where the 
shooting occurred, held at Pete Najera's half of the duplex (R. 
228) , was attended by people of varying ages (R. 345) . Myers, 
however, f e l t more comfortable at Najera's party so he stayed 
there (R. 3 8 7 - 8 ) . Givens, meanwhile, went back and forth to both 
p a r t i e s , which caused some minor resentment by defendant's cousin 
a t Najera's party (R. 3 9 7 ) . 
Defendant was a l s o a t Najera's party (R. 2 4 1 , 261 , 344 , 
388 , 606) . He arrived a t about 10:30 p.m. (R. 255, 606) with h i s 
second cousin Leonard Fernandez (R. 257) . Defendant and 
Fernandez l e f t after about f i f t e e n minutes and went t o La Fontera 
cafe unt i l about 1:00 a.m. (R. 607) . They then returned t o 
Najera's party (R. 609) . There was no apparent dispute or 
trouble between defendant and Givens during the party (R. 2 3 1 , 
269, 347, 397 ) . 
Myers met the defendant at the party and got c l o s e 
enough to see him, i d e n t i f y him (R. 498 ) , and remember him (R. 
- 2 -
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388-9) . While a t t h e p a r t y Myers drank some beer but never 
" a r r i v e d a t a s t a t e of i n t o x i c a t i o n or drunkenness" (R. 389-90) . 
The p a r t y "was slowing down" a t about 3:30 a.m. (R. 401-2) so 
Myers and Givens decided t o l eave (R. 402) . 
Myers t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and Givens l e f t t he pa r ty 
through t h e f ron t door of N a j e r a ' s duplex (R. 404) . As Mtyers 
went through the door he saw " t h r e e gentlemen t h a t opened t h e 
door" (R. 405) . The t h r ee gentlemen were Givens , the d e f e n d a n t , ! 
and someone Myers recognized but did not know h i s name (R. 405) ; 
however, Myers l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d him a s G i l b e r t Najera or Steven 
Najera (R. 424) who look very much a l i k e (R. 368 , 468 , 4 9 3 ) . 
Myers came out of the door f i r s t , shook d e f e n d a n t ' s 
hand and thanked him for t h e good t ime and s t a r t e d toward h i s 
t ruck (R. 409) . Myers then glanced back t o t e l l defendant 
something and saw defendant advance toward t h e v i c t i m (R. 410)• 
Defendant , with a motion of h i s r i g h t hand coming from h i s b e l t , 
s a i d something l i k e , "When you see your f r i e n d s over t h e r e , g ive 
them t h i s " (R. 410) . Myers then saw a muzzle f l a s h from a 
r evo lve r (R. 410 , 412) and saw Givens ge t shot in t h e head (R. 
415) . The revo lve r sounded l i k e i t was in t h e .30 c a l i b e r range 
1
 Defendant c la ims t h a t he l e f t p r i o r t o t h e shoot ing with 
Leonard Fernandez (R. 615) . G i l b e r t Najera a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
defendant l e f t p r i o r t o t h e shoot ing (R. 3 5 0 - 1 ) . Fernandez 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he l e f t with defendant (R. 285) and t h a t he did 
not hear a shot but he did see a body slumped over in t h e en t ry 
way (R. 285 , 305) . He did not see a b u l l e t hole or blood (R. 
305) , but t h e body made no noise nor did i t move (R. 318) . 
Fur thermore , because Fernandez was wearing dark g l a s s e s he could 
not t e l l whether t h e body was a black or a whi te man (R. 3 06) . 
Defendant saw no one ly ing down in the e n t r y way when he l e f t 
wi th Fernandez (R. 6 1 5 ) . 
- 3 -
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(R. 412) although Myers could only see that i t was a blue s t e e l 
revo lver , and could not see the s i z e of ca l iber i t was (R. 412) . 
Defendant then turned toward Myers, pointed the gun a t him and 
asked something t o the e f f e c t , "Would you l i k e some of t h i s , 
too?" (R. 413) . Myers turned and ran from the scene (R. 4 1 3 ) . 
He did not go t o h i s truck because he simply wanted to get out of 
the area and did not think of going t o h i s truck (R. 4 1 4 ) . 
Mfyers ran a short dis tance (R. 413) and then walked (R. 
4 5 3 ) . He came t o the ra i lroad tracks (R. 450) and fol lowed them 
back downtown, walked t o the bus depot, waited four or f i v e 
minutes and then c a l l e d the po l i ce (R. 418) . The po l i ce came t o 
the bus depot and took him t o the po l i ce s ta t ion (R. 419) . 
Officer Opheikens picked Myers up at the bus depot and s ta t ed 
that Myers showed s igns of shock and was "v i s ib ly shaken up and 
he rambled on the same as somebody who had been in a ser ious 
acc ident and had been shaken up, the same type behavior in h i s 
mannerisms" (R. 531) . Mtyers looked a t 30 to 40 photographs t o 
indent i fy who was with defendant when he shot Givens in the head 
(R. 423 , 4 9 1 ) . 
At 4:20 a.m. Officer She l ly Stevensen received a "shots 
f i red" c a l l (R. 182) and s ince she was only a block away she 
arrived in l e s s than a minute (R. 1 7 9 ) . Because the l i g h t i n g was 
poor (R. 181) she b r i e f l y used her f l a s h l i g h t t o look for a 
weapon (R. 1 9 3 ) . Officer Stevensen did have enough l i g h t to see 
the v i c t i m was black without using her f l a s h l i g h t (R. 182) . She 
checked h i s pulse and saw the gunshot wound in the v i c t i m ' s head 
(R. 185) . 
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The paramedics arrived a short time after Officer 
Stevensen (R. 322). They marked the body and tried to revive the 
victim (R. 326) . They saw no signs of life (R. 327) nor any 
signs that the victim had defended himselfr i.e. other wounds (R. 
328> • 
The State attempted to call Dr. Sander, a former 
Assistant Utah Medical Examiner at the time of the homicide. He 
had performed the autopsy on the victim, and was sought by the 
prosecution to testify as to the "cause of death, the size and 
caliber of the wound, the hole that was measured by him with Mr. 
Givens, and "the cause of death from the gunshot wound" (R. 545) . 
Dr. Sander, at the time of trial, was a resident of the State of 
California and "no longer a medical examiner under the control of 
the State." (R. 541).2 
The State did everything p o s s i b l e to have Dr. Sander 
t e s t i f y at the t r i a l . He was subpoenaed, the State "made f l i g h t 
reservat ions for him, hotel reservat ions for him, and v e r i f i e d 
that he did, in f a c t , rece ive a subpoena" (R. 542) . When Dr. 
Sander did not show up on February 27 , 1985 at the t r i a l the 
State contacted Monique Ryser, the State Medical Examiner, to see 
i f she had heard from him (R. 5 4 2 ) . Dr. Ryser said Dr. Sander 
had been in town while t e s t i f y i n g in a c i v i l matter but did not 
mention t o her about t e s t i f y i n g in the present case (R. 542) . 
2 The record inaccurate ly s t a t e s a t one point that "He i s not a 
res ident of the State of Cal i fornia and i s no longer a medical 
examiner under control of the S t a t e . " (R. 5 4 1 ) . (emphasis 
added). This i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with the prosecutor1 s l a t e r 
statement that he had "talked t o Dr. Sander t h i s morning 
personal ly a t h i s res idence in Cal i fornia . . . ." (R. 543) . 
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The S ta te then phoned Dr. Sander in Cal i fornia and he could not 
g ive "any s a t i s f a c t o r y reason why he did not respond t o the 
subpoena other than he had commitments. . . ." (R. 5 4 3 ) . 
Rendition would have been impractical unless the Court continued 
the case (R. 5 4 3 ) . The S t a t e , therefore , moved t o have Dr. 
Sander's testimony from the preliminary hearing read i n t o the 
record (R. 542-3) . 
The defendant objected on the ground he had new 
quest ions t o ask Dr. Sander (R. 543) . The defense then offered 
an a l t e r n a t i v e . If defendant "could ask Dr. Ryser some ques t ions 
with respect t o her observat ions , then perhaps that may remedy 
i t " (R. 5 4 3 ) . Defendant had t o f i r s t speak with Dr. Ryserf 
however (R. 544) . 
Dr. Ryser was capable of answering a l l of defendant's 
addi t iona l quest ions (R. 5 4 4 - 7 ) . The Court thereaf ter allowed 
the S ta te t o "introduce the testimony given by Dr. Sander at the 
preliminary hearing . . . ." (R. 547) and s tated "I do not see 
from the statement of the defense or the p o s i t i o n of the defense 
that the defendant had nothing to do with t h i s crime, as unduly 
prejudicing the defendant in the establishment of the two 
elements involved here , mostly the cause of death and the s i z e of 
the wound." (R. 5 4 8 ) . 
Dr. Sander t e s t i f i e d at the preliminary hearing that 
the cause of death was the b u l l e t in the v i c t i m ' s brain (R. 564) . 
The slug was e i t h e r .32 or .38 ca l iber (R. 563 , 5 7 3 ) . He a l so 
found no evidence of a s truggle between the v ic t im and defendant, 
other than the s i n g l e b u l l e t hole in Givens1 head (R. 576) . Dr. 
- 6 -
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Sander a lso removed two b u l l e t fragments from the vict im 1 s skul l 
(R. 513) • These two fragments were lead colored, the same as a 
•common lead bu l l e t" (R. 5 1 3 ) . Last ly , Dr. Sander t e s t i f i e d that 
the gunshot wound indicated that the discharge was a t a very 
c lo se range to the v i c t i m ' s head, perhaps • three t o four maybe 
f i v e inches away* (R. 563, 575) . 
Officer John Johnson was assigned t o the case and went 
to defendant's home with Lieutenant Leonard and Detect ive Jim 
Leary to arrest defendant concerning the homicide (R. 5 1 6 ) . 
While Johnson was at defendant's home he asked, and rece ived , 
permission t o search defendant's car for "a gun or b u l l e t s , 
anything re la ted t o the shooting" (R. 479) . Johnson "found one 
l i v e round of .38 ca l iber ammunition on the floorboard" of the 
front passenger s ide of the v e h i c l e (R. 480) . The b u l l e t had a 
s o l i d lead s lug that was unjacketed (R. 4 8 0 ) . 
Defendant asserted that the b u l l e t was dropped in h i s 
car in l a t e February or early March when he went targe t 
pract i c ing with a snubnose (R. 636) .38 cal iber p i s t o l (R. 596) . 
Defendant borrowed the gun from his nephew (R. 6 3 0 ) , Jonathan 
Twit t le (R. 637) . 
The S ta te and the defendant s t ipu la ted t o the testimony 
of Robert D. Baldwin, a cr imino log i s t with the Utah Crime 
Laboratory. His report i s that the b u l l e t fragments found in the 
v i c t i m ' s sku l l came from a .357 or a .38 cal iber s h e l l (R. 657) . 
El i Archuleta t e s t i f i e d that he happened t o "bump" i n t o 
defendant a t a bar one night and defendant t o l d him that he had 
shot a black man because they were arguing (R. 6 7 0 - 1 ) . Defendant 
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also to ld Archuleta tha t "He d idn f t use any gun t h a t I 
[Archuleta] had sold him, tha t he used a •32" (R. 665-6). 
Defendant had purchased a .38 snubnose from Archuleta prior to 
the shooting (R. 669-70) .3 There were two kinds of b u l l e t s in 
the gun Archuleta sold t o defendant, lead and a jacketed type (R. 
673). Archuleta was shown the bu l l e t found in defendant 's ca r , 
Sta te Exhibit 19 , and asked i f he had seen a bu l l e t of tha t so r t 
before and Archuleta s t a t ed , "Those are the ones" (R. 673). 
The jury began i t s de l ibe ra t ions a t 10:30 a.m. on March 
1 , 1985 (R. 687). During the de l ibe ra t ions the jury sent a note 
to the judge asking, "What procedure do we follow if because of 
lack of evidence e i the r way we keep coming up with an uneven 
vote . At what point a re we hung?" (R. 688-9) . The jury returned 
t o the courtroom a t 6:30 p.m. t o receive an addi t ional 
i n s t ruc t ion (R. 689) . The Court then asked if e i ther the j 
defendant or the S ta t e had any object ions t o the proposed 
supplemental ins t ruc t ion (included as Appendix B of t h i s b r i e f ) , 
t o which the defense rep l i ed , "I have no object ion. I have read 
i t " (R. 689) , and the S ta t e also answered, "I have no objection" 
(R. 689). The Court then gave the i n s t ruc t ion t o the ju ry (R. 
689). The jury returned t o de l ibe ra t e a t 6:35 p.m. and a t 8:30 
p.m. they returned a verd ic t of gu i l ty (R. 689-90). 
3 Archuleta, a t f i r s t , could not remember if he had sold 
defendant the .38 ca l iber gun four or f ive months before the 
shooting or four or f ive months af te r the shooting (R. 667) . 
However, the Sta te drew a "time continum" with the news of the 
shooting as a reference point and with t h i s v isua l aid Archuleta 
indica ted that defendant bought the gun before the shooting (R. 
66 9-70) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I . De fendants claim that he was denied 
e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel was not preserved below for t h i s 
appeal, and therefore , should not be considered by t h i s Court. 
Also, defendant f a i l s to s a t i s f y h i s burden of showing that he 
suffered pre jud ic ia l error when h i s counsel f a i l e d t o object and 
consented to the g iv ing of a supplemental in s t ruc t ion to the 
jury . This f a i l u r e t o object was merely a t a c t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n 
that did not achieve the des ired r e s u l t s . 
Point I I . Defendant should be precluded from ra is ing 
the i s s u e of the g iv ing of the supplemental jury ins truct ion 
because he f a i l e d t o preserve i t in the t r i a l court . 
Neverthe less , the supplemental i n s t r u c t i o n , incorporating an 
"Allen charge," was not coercive or otherwise improper and 
comported with the standards for such jury ins truc t ions 
e s t a b l i s h e d by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court, and approved by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Point I I I . Defendant's convict ion i s supported by 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence. The j u r y f s unanimous verd ic t was based on 
such substant ia l evidence that reasonable minds could pos s ib ly 
f ind defendant gu i l ty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Point IV. The defendant apparently withdrew h is 
objec t ion to the reading in to the record of the testimony of an 
unavai lable wi tness who t e s t i f i e d at the Preliminary Hearing. 
Neverthe less , the defendant was not denied h i s r ight t o 
confrontation and cross-examination under a l l the f a c t s and 
circumstances of t h i s case , where defendant was accorded the 
- 8 ( a ) -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opportunity to cross-examine the doctor and other witnesses on 
a l l material aspects of the case relating to Dr. Sander's 
testimony both at the Preliminary Hearing and at t r i a l . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE BY 
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
INSTRUCTION. 
Appellant a s s e r t s that he was denied e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of counsel by h i s counse l ' s f a i l u r e to object t o the 
g iv ing of a supplemental ins truc t ion which contained an Al len 
charge (See Point II of t h i s br ie f r i n f r a ) . 
I t should be noted a t the outse t r that in support of 
t h i s claim, he a s s e r t s numerous f a c t s which are not in the record 
on appeal. He draws these f a c t s from a s e r i e s of s e l f - s e r v i n g 
a f f i d a v i t s , which he attached t o a motion t o remand t h i s case , 
f i l e d with t h i s Court a f ter t h i s appeal was commenced. Notably, 
t h i s Court denied h i s motion t o remand. (See, Appendix A which 
i s a copy of the Order of Denial) . Now he attempts t o use the 
a f f i d a v i t s as i f they somehow have been magically incorporated 
in to t h i s appe l la te record. They have not, and t h i s Court may 
not consider matters outs ide the record. S ta te v. Cook, 26 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 21 (1986) . 
Therefore/ the fo l lowing f a c t s asserted by defendant in 
support of h i s i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel claim may not be 
considered on appeal: 
1 . He was required t o inges t antabuse. 
2 . Considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s arose between 
defendant and h i s counsel . 
3 . His counsel gave him a b o t t l e of 
Seagrams VO. 
4 . Defendant and h i s counsel argued over 
the proposed addit ional i n s t r u c t i o n . 
5 . Defendant s p e c i f i c a l l y opposed the 
added i n s t r u c t i o n and demanded h i s 
counsel move for a m i s t r i a l . 
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6. Defendant requested a change of counsel . 
7 . Defendant did anything but consent t o 
h i s counse l ' s representat ion . 
8 . Defendant's counsel fought defendant's 
attempts t o have another attorney 
approved to defend him. 
9 . Defendant's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with h i s 
counsel was expressed to both h i s 
counsel and the Legal Defenders 
Assoc iat ion on many occas ions . 
1 0 . Defendant t o l d h i s counsel that he 
wanted a new t r i a l . 
1 1 . Under no circumstances would he accept 
further i n s t r u c t i o n s on the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a hung jury. 
12 . Defendant's counsel t o l d defendant she 
would get a new t r i a l i f he would keep 
q u i e t . 
1 3 . Defendant agreed, saying "That's a dea l ." 
14. Defendant was not aware that Judge Frederick 
would give a further i n s t r u c t i o n t o the 
jury. 
1 5 . Defendant did not review the supplemental % 
ins t ruc t ion unt i l i t was read t o the jury. 
16 . Defendant was embroiled in i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
c o n f l i c t with h i s counsel . 
The only record evidence on t h i s i s sue i s that counsel f a i l e d t o 
object t o and, in f a c t , concurred in the t r i a l court ' s g iv ing of 
the supplemental in s t ruc t ion , af ter the jury had i n i t i a l l y 
indicated they might be deadlocked.4 
Notably defendant claims that he at no point had the 
opportunity to object t o the supplemental ins t ruc t ion because of 
the a l l eged c o n f l i c t between defendant and h i s counsel . The 
record b e l i e s t h i s claim. Defendant a lso c i t e s t o S ta te v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71 (Utah) c e r t , denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) in an 
attempt to show that because of t h i s c o n f l i c t defendant was 
denied e f f e c t i v e as s i s tance of counse l . Yet, in Wood the 
4
 Even were t h i s Court t o consider the above f a c t s from the 
defendant's a f f i d a v i t s , many of them are i r r e l e v a n t t o whether he 
was denied e f f e c t i v e as s i s tance of counse l . 
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defendant repeatedly made i t known t o the Court that there was a 
c o n f l i c t between h i s counsel and him. ! £ . In the ins tant case 
the record i s abso lute ly s i l e n t concerning any a l l eged c o n f l i c t 
between defendant and h i s counsel during the e n t i r e t r i a l . 
In addit ion t o the factual d i f f erence , the i s sue in Wood 
was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . Wood was a t odds with h i s counsel 
over what defenses should have been presented. 1^. Defendant in 
the present case f claims that h i s counsel refused to present a 
"defense" when she did not object t o the Allen ins t ruc t ion . When 
counsel did not object t o the ins truc t ion defendant was not 
deprived of any defense. Objecting or not object ing t o a jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n i s not a l e g a l defense , i t i s part of t r i a l s trategy 
and t a c t i c s . The rule i s w e l l - s e t t l e d that criminal t r i a l 
t a c t i c s l i e within the profess iona l judgment of counsel and may 
not be d ic ta ted by defendant. State v . Wood, 648 P.2d at 91; 
S ta te v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976). Chief Jus t i ce 
Burger, in a concurring opinion s tated the fo l lowing: 
Only such basic dec i s ions as whether 
to plead g u i l t y , waive a jury, or t e s t i f y 
in one's own behalf are u l t imate ly for the 
accused t o make. See ABA Report on Standards 
Relating t o the Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function § 5 . 2 f pp 237-238 (approved 
Draft 1971) . 
Wainwright v . Sykes, 433 U.S. 7 2 , 9 3 , reh. denied, 434 U.S. 880 
(1977) . 
Defendant, in order to prove i n e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of 
counsel , "has the burden to demonstrate that counse l ' s 
representat ion f a l l s below an objec t ive standard of 
reasonableness ." S ta te v. Frame. Utah Supreme Court Case Nos. 
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21002, 21005, f i l ed , July 31 , 1986. Defendant must also "prove 
that spec i f ic , identif ied acts or omissions fa l l outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance. The clcdm may not 
be speculative, but must be a demonstrative rea l i ty , suff ic ient 
to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised 'reasonable professional judgment.'" 
1st. ( c i tes omitted). In addition, "An unfavorable result does 
not compel a conclusion of ineffect ive assistance of counsel." 
Id. This Court in Frame went on to say that: 
Any deficiency must be prejudicial to 
defendant. It i s not enough to claim that 
the alleged errors had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome or could have had a prejudicial 
effect on the fact finders. To be found 
suff ic ient ly prejudicial , defendant must 
affirmatively show that a "reasonable ^ 
probability" e x i s t s that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been different. 
We have defined "reasonable probability" as 
that suff ic ient to undermine confidence in 
the r e l i a b i l i t y of the verdict . 
However, these principles are not 
applied as a mechanical t e s t , but are guides 
to the ultimate focus upon the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding challenged. The 
purpose of the inquiry i s simply to insure 
that defendant receives a fa ir t r i a l . 
Consequently, in determining the fundamental 
fairness of defendant's t r i a l , we need not 
determine whether counsel's performance 
was deficient i f defendant f a i l s to sat isfy 
his burden of showing that he suffered unfair 
prejudice as a result of the alleged 
def ic iencies . 
As stated by the United States Supreme 
Court in StrickJUnfl: 
[A] court need not determine whether 
counsel's performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered by defendant 
as a result of the alleged def ic iencies . 
The object of an ineffectiveness claim i s 
not to grade counsel's performance. If i t 
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i s eas ier to dispose of an i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
claim on the around of lack of s u f f i c i e n t 
prejudice , which we expect w i l l often be so , 
that course should be fo l lowed. 
104 S. Ct. at 206 9-70 . 
Xfl# 
In the present case , defendant f a i l e d "to s a t i s f y h i s 
burden of showing that he suffered unfair prejudice as a re su l t 
of the a l l eged d e f i c i e n c i e s . " I d . After the Allen charge was 
given the jury could j u s t have e a s i l y acquit ted defendant. His 
claim of i n e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of counsel i s purely s p e c u l a t i v e . 
The dec i s ion of whether or not to object t o a proposed 
ins t ruc t ion belongs t o counsel , not to a defendant. Here, 
counsel made a profess ional choice of t r i a l s trategy that did not 
have the desired r e s u l t . As s tated in Frame t h i s "does not 
compel a conclusion of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel ." Id.5 
Because d e f e n d a n t s counsel rendered "reasonable 
profess iona l judgment" in deciding not to object t o the 
supplemental Allen charge i n s t r u c t i o n , which ul t imate ly had an 
unfavorable r e s u l t , defendant has f a i l e d to meet h i s burden of 
proving i n e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of counsel . 
5 As a corol lary rule , courts have also recognized that attorney 
error or misjudgment which f a l l s short of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s under 
the Sixth Amendment does not open the door to allow review of the 
merits of i s s u e s not preserved at t r i a l . See Marks v. E s t e l l e , 
691 F.2d 730, 735 (5th C i r . ) , c e r t , denied, 103 S. Ct. 3090 
(1983); Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 288 (6th C i r . ) , c e r t , 
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1608 (1984); Deitz v. Solem, 677 F.2d 672, 
673-75 (8th Cir . 1982); Tz i r i zo tak i s v. LeFevre, 736 F.2d 57 62 
(2d C i r . ) , c e r t , denied, 105 S. Ct. 216 (1984); Palmes v . 
Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1511, 1525 (11th C i r . ) , c e r t , denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 227 (1984) . ££ . Strickland y . Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984) . 
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F i n a l l y , as w i l l be shown in Point I I , i n f r a , the 
g iv ing of the Allen charge i n s t r u c t i o n was not improper. Thus, 
defense counse l ' s f a i l u r e t o oppose i t was not erroneous, and did 
not amount t o a Sixth Amendment v i o l a t i o n of the r ight to 
e f f e c t i v e as s i s tance of counse l . 
POINT I? 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION CONTAINING 
> AN " ALL EN CHARGE" DID NOT COERCE THE 
JURY TO REACH A VERDICT, NOR CONSTITUTE 
A MANIFEST INJUSTICE REQUIRING REVERSAL 
OF THIS CASE. 
• " '" | f 
During the course of jury d e l i b e r a t i o n s , the jury 
inquired about what procedure they should fol low i f they kept 
coming up with an uneven v o t e . The court, with f u l l approval by 
the prosecutor and defense counsel , further ins tructed the jury 
with what has come to be known as an "Allen charge." See Allen 
v. United S t a t e s , 164 U.S. 492 (1896). The f u l l t e x t of t h i s 
supplemental ins truc t ion i s s e t forth in Appendix B of t h i s 
br ie f . Despite h i s counse l ' s concurrence in the g iv ing of the 
supplemental i n s t r u c t i o n , defendant now claims that the court 
committed r e v e r s i b l e error by g iv ing i t . 
Defendant should be precluded from ra is ing t h i s i s sue 
now not only because of h i s f a i l u r e to object to the g iv ing of 
the i n s t r u c t i o n , but h i s counse l 1 s outr ight approval of i t being 
given (R. 689) . Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (1985 Supp.) ; S t a t e v. 
B a r e l l a , 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1986); S t a t e v . Noren, 704 P.2d 
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568 (Utah 1985).6 
To avoid h i s own procedural defaul t and f a i l u r e to 
properly preserve the i s s u e for appeal defendant a s s e r t s that the 
g iv ing of the in s t ruc t ion was p la in error , and that t h i s Court 
should therefore reach the merits of h i s claim t o avoid a 
manifest i n j u s t i c e . See Utah R. Crim. Proc. 1 9 ( c ) ; S t a t e v» 
L e s l i e , 672 P.2d 79 f 81 (Utah 1983) . 
Defendant has f a i l e d t o meet h i s burden of e s tab l i sh ing 
manifest i n j u s t i c e in t h i s case . F i r s t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
how the g iv ing of an "Allen charge" can per se amount t o manifest 
i n j u s t i c e considering that such i n s t r u c t i o n s have been express ly 
approved by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court (Allen v . United 
S t a t e s , 164 U.S. 492 (1896) ) , as not being v i o l a t i v e of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights of criminal defendants. The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has a l so recognized the ir u t i l i t y and has 
refused t o find them per se prejudic ia l or coerc ive . Munroe v . 
United S t a t e s , 424 F.2d 234 (10th Cir . 1970); United S ta te s v . 
Dyba, 554 F.2d 417 420 (10th C i r . ) f c e r t , denied, 434 U.S. 830 
(1977). Moreover, respondent i s unable t o f ind any case where 
t h i s Court has precluded the use of ins truc t ions l i k e those given 
in the ins tant case which endeavor to encourage a jury t o arrive 
at a v e r d i c t . 
b
 Defendant a s s e r t s that he did not have the opportunity t o 
objec t t o the supplemental i n s t r u c t i o n . The t r i a l t ranscr ip t 
b e l i e s t h i s a s s e r t i o n . Moreover, defendant attempts t o support 
t h i s claim by way of s e l f - s e r v i n g a f f i d a v i t s he f i l e d during the 
course of t h i s appeal which are c l ear ly not part of the appel la te 
record. This Court may not consider matters outs ide the record. 
See Point I , supra. 
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Allen v . United S t a t e s i s s t i l l good law today. I t has 
never been overruled by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court. The 
Allen Court authorized the g iv ing of supplemental in s t ruc t ions 
when j u r i e s appeared deadlocked. In reviewing what type of 
in s t ruc t ion i s permiss ib le the Court observed: 
These i n s t r u c t i o n s were q u i t e lengthy and were f 
in substance, that in a large proportion of 
cases absolute certa inty could not be expected; 
that although the verdict must be the verdic t 
of each indiv idual juror , and not a mere 
acquiescence in the conclusion of h i s f e l l o w s , 
y e t they should examine the quest ion submitted 
with candor and with a proper regard and 
deference t o the opinions of each other; that i t 
was t h e i r duty to decide the case i f they could 
consc ient ious ly do so ; that they should l i s t e n , 
with a d i s p o s i t i o n t o be convinced, to each 
o t h e r ' s arguments; tha t , i f much the larger 
number were for conv ic t ion , a d i s sent ing juror 
should consider whether h i s doubt was a 
reasonable one which made no impression upon 
the minds of so many men, equally honest , 
equally i n t e l l i g e n t with himself . If , upon 
the other hand, the majority was for a c q u i t t a l , 
the minority ought to ask themselves whether they 
might not reasonably doubt the correctness 
of a judgment which was not concurred in by the 
majority . These i n s t r u c t i o n s were taken l i t e r a l l y 
from a charge in a criminal case which was approved 
of by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 
Commonwealth v . Tuey, 8 Cush. 1 , and by the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut in S ta te v. Smith, 49 
Connecticut, 376, 386. 
164 U.S. at 501. 
The Court further noted t h a t : 
. . . the v e r d i c t of the jury should represent 
the opinion of each individual juror, i t by 
no means fo l lows that opinions may not be 
changed by conference in the jury-room. The 
very objec t of the jury system i s to secure 
unanimity by a comparison of v iews, and by 
arguments among the jurors themselves . I t 
c e r t a i n l y cannot be the law that each juror 
should not l i s t e n with deference to the 
arguments and with a d i s t r u s t of h i s own 
judgment, i f he f inds a large majority of the 
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jury taking a d i f f erent view of the case from 
what he does himself . It cannot be that each 
juror should go to represent h i s opinion of 
the case a t that moment; or f that he should 
- c lo se h i s ears t o the arguments of men who 
are equally honest and i n t e l l i g e n t as himself . 
There was no error in these i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
Defendant does not a l l e g e that the supplemental 
i n s t r u c t i o n given in h i s case was v i o l a t i v e of that which has 
been authorized by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court or the Tenth 
Circui t Court of Appeals. Instead r he urges that t h i s Court 
r e j e c t those l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s in favor of a more r e s t r i c t i v e 
standard, presumably as a matter of s t a t e law (although he f a i l s 
t o re ly on Utah's c o n s t i t u t i o n for a more r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e ) . 
Such suggest ions are better addressed t o Supreme Court Advisory 
Committees on Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure, rather than t o 
t h i s Court in the context of an appeal where the i ssue was not 
even preserved below. There simply has been no v i o l a t i o n here of 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proportions t o support a f inding of 
manifest i n j u s t i c e so as to overlook defendant's f a i l u r e to 
preserve t h i s i ssue for review. 
, Defendant c i t e s t o some j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have e i ther 
re jected "Allen charges" as a matter of s t a t e law or have 
modified the Allen language, (as was done in the instant c a s e ) , 
to better ensure that jurors are not impermissibly coerced in to a 
v e r d i c t . An a n a l y s i s of even these au thor i t i e s e s t a b l i s h e s that 
no manifest i n j u s t i c e occurred in t h i s case . 
The overriding concern that some courts have had i s 
whether Allen charges might coerce a jury in to a v e r d i c t . People 
v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835 , 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 
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(1977); S t a t e v . Nicholson. 315 So.2d 639 (La. 1975); S t a t e v . 
Garza. 185 Neb. 445 , 176 N.W.2d 664 (1970); S t a t e v. A l s ton . 294 
N.C. 577, 243 S.E.2d 354 (1978); S t a t e v . Marsh. 260 Or. 416 , 490 
P.2d 491 , c e r t , denied. 406 U.S. 974 (1971); Commonwealth v . 
Spencer. 442 Pa. 328 , 275 A.2d 299 (1971) . The Allen charge, 
however, i s widely recognized as not being coerc ive per s e . 
United S t a t e s v . Thomas. 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1 9 7 1 ) , En banc. 
United S t a t e s v. Mason. 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir . 1980) . The 
Second Circu i t Court has s ta ted t h a t , "our view that the 'Al len ' 
charge i s not neces sar i l y coerc ive i s by no means unique. See 
e . g . , United S t a t e s v . Sawyers. 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970) , 
United S t a t e s v . B a r n h i l l . 305 F.2d 164 (6th C i r . ) , c e r t , denied. 
371 U.S. 865 (1962)". United S t a t e s v . Martinez. 446 F.2d 118 
(2nd Cir. ) c e r t , denied. 404 U.S. 944 (1971) . 
The vast majority of j u r i s d i c t i o n s ins tead take the 
approach that reviewing courts should look at a l l of the f a c t s 
and circumstances under which such in s t ruc t ions were given in 
determining whether impermissible coercion was r e a l l y present in 
any given case . Uunrpe v , United S t a t e s . 424 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 
1970) . S_ee a l s o United S t a t e s v . Meyers. 410 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir.) 
reh. denied. 396 U.S. 949 and c e r t , denied. 396 U.S. 835 (1969); 
United S t a t e s v. Mi tche l l . 720 F.2d 371 (4th Cir . 1983); United 
S ta te s v . Scruggs. 583 F.2d 238 (5th Cir . 1978); Williams v . 
Parke. 741 F.2d 847 (6th Cir . ) c e r t , denied. U.S. , 84 
L.Ed.2d 787, 105 S.Ct. 1399 (1985); United S t a t e s v . Pope. 415 
F.2d 685 (8th Cir . ) c e r t , denied. 397 U.S. 950 (1969); United 
S t a t e s v . Seawel l . 583 F.2d 416 (9th Cir . ) c e r t , denied. 439 U.S. 
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i n s t r u c t i nq t u t ju ry t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r h o n e s t c o n v i c t i o n s . 
U n i t e d b t a t e s v . Dybdi l. nl I , ill I I ' i| II I II III I  II i , I i, t i l , 
d e n i e d , 414 I.'.fi 830 { P i 1 1 , nee ci f o t c o n s u l t a t i on c o n s i s t e n t 
%i mi I Ii e xorc i i s f nl i n d i v i d u a l i n d q m e n t s ) . T h i s w i s done in Hit 
i n s t a n t c a s e . The j u d g e p rop t • 1/ b a l a i u e d H11 ' i> I i '", < \ 1 , 
t w i c e s t a t i n g t h a t e a c h "juror must not s u r r e n d e i h i s h o n e s t 
i 11 w II I I mi i n mi i II i n l i i i II i II I i mi mi mi in i II i v i i l l i i i II i II idll u n t 1 1 in I J i j 
Ap[>eiidin I-1, I n d e e d , t h e l i i s t r ucLiori g i v e n h e r e i s n e a r l y 
v e r b a t i m t o om •: i n I I n i t e d _ _ S t a t e s m v . Sawyers , 4 . ; h\,c I ? 35 
in 1 1 III i 
the court twice included language 
emphasizing that no juror should surrender 
her conscientious convictions because of :i.t 
opinions of other ju ro r s or for the mere purpc& 
of returning a ve rd i c t . Indeedf to properly 
balance h i s i n s t r u c t i o n the t r i a l judge charged. 
[ j j f
 a m a j o r £ t y U I e v e n a 
^i /-v.. l e sse r number of you are for 
. acqui t ta l ,- other jurors auVL 
to ser iously ask themselves 
again whether they do not have 
reason to doubt the correctness 
of a judgment which is r r»t 
II 9 - '. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
concurred in by many of t h e i r 
fe l low jurors r and whether they 
should not d i s t r u s t , the weight 
or s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence which 
f a i l s t o convince the minds of 
several of t h e i r f e l l ows t o a 
moral cer ta in ty and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
There was not the s l i g h t e s t int imation of 
impatience with the minority, nor any words that 
could be construed as a threat or even an ; 
express ion of d i sp leasure . 
423 F.2d at 1340. Clearly then, the i n s t r u c t i o n , as worded in 
the instance case , was not impermissibly coercive of any minority 
of jurors . 
Concern i s a l s o ra i sed that Al len charges: (1) 
erroneously s t a t e that the case w i l l have to be r e t r i e d i f the 
jury does not reach a verdic t (a misstatement of the law); and 
(2) impermissibly advise the jury to consider po ten t ia l cos t s of 
r e t r i a l which i s a matter outside the record evidence . 
Notably, the Allen charge in the instant case did not 
say the case would have t o be r e t r i e d . I t correc t ly s ta ted that 
" i t must be disposed of some time". (Appendix B at page 1 of 
Supplemental Ins truct ion ) . This i s not a misstatement of the 
law. The case might be disposed of by r e t r i a l or d ismissa l of 
the charges by the prosecution or a p lea agreement, d ivers ion 
program, e t c . More important, t h i s statement i s not coerc ive . 
As the Sixth Circui t Court noted, "there i s a c lear d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the statement • t h i s case must be decided1 and ' i t must be 
disposed of some t i m e 1 . " United S t a t e s v . Harris , 391 F.2d 348 
(6th C i r . ) , c e r t , denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968) . 
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"TIIP Tiptith C i r c u i t C o u r t e x a m i n e d 111 • • p r o p r i e t y of 
1,1(1,1 v l i /. i ' ' P I I ^ H M 1 I " f i «i .1 i i i i et r i a l and >» • er 
l o o k i n g a t a l l t i i c u r o s t a n c e s whun mlit IMM i in i i nil w in i|l< i -n r 
c o n c l u d e d tli I I I c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e not s l u w n t o h a v e b e e n 
pi e j . j d i i i,,"" • " i , ! , ! 1 , l"«,i»i« i ' ' I r i l e L v - J ^ M # 5 5 4 F . 2 d a t 
4 2 1 . • • . 
More r e c e n t l y t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t a d d r e s s e d a vase II ril 
i a c i u di • i;J 111 v l; (11 I i w ,i 11. • \ 1.11. I 111' 1111" " 111". f i "i i "'• I'. i"' i w" I i "" 11 i " w » i" h J 
substantially similar to tht1 one given in the present case: 
Now, tills i ib an important cane. I'he t r ial 
"has consumed considerable time, effort, and money 
to both the defense and the prosecution. And if 
you should fail to agree on a verdictf this case 
Is , of course, left open and i t wi 11 have to be 
tried again. Obviously another t r ia l would only 
serve to increase the time and effort and money to 
both sides. And there Is no reason to believe 
that this case could be tried again by either side 
better or more exhaustively than i t has been tried 
before you. Any future jury must be selected in 
, the same manner, from the same sources as you were 
selected and chosen. There Is no reason to believe 
that this case could ever be submitted to twelve 
men and women more conscientious, more impartial 
or more competent to decide or that more clearer 
evidence would be produced. 
Now, If a substantial majority of your number 
> for conviction, each dissenting juror ought to 
sider whether the doubt in his or her own mind 
is a reasonable one since i t appears to make no 
effective impression on the minds of the others. 
On the other hand, if a
 majority or even a 
It ser number of you are for acquittal, the other 
j iiuiois should seriously ask themselves again and •• « 
more thoughtfully whether they do not have a 
reason to doubt the correctness of their judgment 
which is not shared by several of your fellow 
jurors. Whether they should distrust the weight 
and sufficiency of the evidence which fai ls to 
convince several other jurors beyond a reasonable 
•'
 >; doubt. But remember at all times that no juror 
i s expected to yield a conscientious conviction 
he or she may have as to the weight or effect 
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of the evidence. But remember a l so , tha t a f te r 
fu l l de l ibera t ion and considerat ion of the 
evidence in the case, i t i s your duty to agree 
upon a ve rd ic t if you can do so without 
surrendering your conscientious convict ion. You 
must also remember tha t if the evidence in the 
case f a i l s t o e s t ab l i sh g u i l t to you as a juror 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then i t i s your duty 
t o vote not g u i l t y . 
United S ta tes v . Kelly, 783 F.2d 575, 576-77, (5th Cir . 1986). 
This ins t ruc t ion contains a l l of the i s sues raised by defendant 
and the Fif th Ci rcu i t s t a t e d : 
The ins t ruc t ion used in t h i s case cannot 
be f a i r l y read to have coerced the ju ry ; on 
the contrary, the language used comports with 
language t h i s court approved in United S ta t e s 
v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1203 n . 3 (5th 
Cir . 1982), and i t r e f l e c t s an understanding 
of t h i s c o u r t ' s admonitions concerning Allen 
charges. 
783 F.2d a t 577. 
I t i s c lear t ha t a balanced Allen charge, l ike the one 
given in the present case, i s not coercive where an admonition to 
the minority i s balanced with an admonition t o the majority and 
the ins t ruc t ion could equally r e s u l t in a ve rd ic t of a c q u i t t a l as 
well as convict ion. Also, i t i s not impermissbly coercive in 
advising the j u ro r s of the costs of any r e t r i a l or tha t the case 
must be disposed of some time. 
F ina l ly , defendant a s s e r t s tha t the two hours of 
de l ibe ra t ion a f te r the Allen charge was given (R. 689) , i s 
evidence tha t the gui l ty ve rd ic t was "blasted" from the jury and 
implies coercion under the f ac t s and circumstances of t h i s case. 
Yet, as noted above, the court gave a balanced, modified Allen 
i n s t r u c t i o n . Where an i n s t ruc t i on on, i t s face, i s balanced and 
not coercive, many courts have found the factor of the amount of 
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t u n e s p e n t d e l i b e r a t i n g a f t e r t h e g i v i n g ol t h e i n s t r u c t i o n ••••"• 
Jim - H f M iant U n i U ' d S t . £ ^ b . . . y . fe'ciuysSp "'I'M 1« ' 'd M B ( " n t h f 
1978) , See aljso Dnited s t a t e s ¥• Hynesi i2i I , J J /'Lul 12nd .) 
c e r t , d en i ed , 399 O.S. 9JJ (1970), where the jury r e tu rned a f te r 
f \\ ' n nil mil P S . * J 
In HIP i n s t a n t case , thp ju ry d e l i b e r a t e d for about 
e igh t hours and Bnnt a message to 1 (UP judge r eques t inq fur ther 
u j . j t i -cause t l i I | mi in | w-iii1 ill nil m h ill I I ' liHH 'ill , il In 
court sa id t o the "jury, " l a d i e s and gentlemen ol' the j u r y , 
because UUL most iecenL inqui ry reqardinq your i n a b i l i t y 
apparen t^ , to a r r i v e a t a unanimous p o s i t i o n , ihe cour t and 
counsel rave iM.er mined t o give you t h i r further i n s t r u c t i o n 
V111 I In 11 in mi i in in " I in i i I i I 11 iii I l« (i II (ii i r im I in 5 
t h e n g i v e n t h e A l i . f J in 1 I r u c t i o n IK, fiB'll I  I n i e i s n o t h i n g i n 
t in j i r e c o r d t u i m p l y t h e r o u i t c o e r c e d t h e j n r ^ w h e n h e q a ^ i I l i t 
ini.) t i in mi i" f ;i on in 11 mi mi I  I in i1 in III I in in I in 11 in in mi I .i I I i i in mi r.M , I h e i l l J e n 
c h a r g e g i v e n i n t h e p i e n e n t c a s e s t r i k e s a t a i l b a l a n c e b e t w u u i i 
t h e a d m o n i t i o n t o r e a c h a u n a n i m o u s d e c i s i n n a inl t h e w • i r n i ri n t u 
t h e j u r o r s null I o y n i i J t h i n c o n s c i e n t i o u s j i u l jmt nt , in u n l e t t o 
re,ii!;ich t h a t d e c i s i o n . B e c a u s e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on i t s f a c e w a s n o t 
r 111 ' i i • in v • i ."in mi i Il I II in i mi i n n in I II i l i M • r i III i I 111 II in n i: w i se i i uilii ca t e ::: ::  >er • :::::li :::)i: i 
I li n oonv i c t i on ul del endant should be af f i i: med. » 
Respondent i s aware that a case by case a n a l y s i s can be 
u i i i n t h i i i i m i II In i l l II II " i n - 1 in i l l l i I III mi i mi III III in mi in 11 t i l l : it E!' D C Ci i: ::: i iii t I: :ia E 
banned Line of Alien charges In la^um of tl :ie ABA S tandards 
r e l a t i n g t o t r i a l li\ nil , \ •I,.I| mi Si n Appendi i '"'C ' , wl lich i s t h e 
M\ ! I dii (I nil i I li ill iii, mi I i i in ij in li i Wit e d tl: :t a t A 1 ] g n c h a r g e s a x e 
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not per .§§. coerc ive ; however, "we have predicated our dec i s ion on 
the needs of j u d i c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . . . . " United S t a t e s v. 
Thomas. 449 F.2d at 1187. £eje a l so United S t a t e s v . Chaney. 559 
P.2d 1098 (7th Cir . 1977) . Some s t a t e s which have affirmed the 
Al len charge, never the l e s s , have adopted the ABA Standards for 
further c a s e s , e . g . , Kelly v. S t a t e , 270 Md. 139 , 310 A.2d 538 
(1973); Wilkins v . S t a t e , 609 P.2d 309 (Nev. 1980); S t a t e v . 
Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1980); People v. S u l l i v a n , 392 
Mich. 324 , 220 N.W.2d 441 (1974) . Other s t a t e s have not 
abandoned the Allen charge but recommend ABA Standards, see e . g . , . 
S ta te v . Blake, 113 N.H. 115 , 305 A.2d 300 (1973); S t a t e v . 
Perrv. 131 V t . 337, 306 A.2d 110 (1973). Only f i v e s t a t e s r e j e c t 
Allen and a l s o have not adopted the ABA Standards see e . g . , State 
v . Thomas 86 Ar iz . 161 , 342 P.2d 197 (1959); Taylor v. People , 
176 Colo. 316 , 490 P.2d 292 (1971); S t a t e v . Randall , 137 Mont. 
534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960); S t a t e v. Maupin, 42 Ohio S t .2d 473, 71 
Ohio ops.2d 485 , 330 N.E.2d 708 (1975); S t a t e v . Ferguson, 84 SD. 
305 , 175 N.W.2d 57 (1970) . Perhaps, at some po int , the matter 
should be referred for study. But based upon the foregoing 
a n a l y s i s , defendant has not preserved the i s s u e for review, has 
not e s t a b l i s h e d error or manifest i n j u s t i c e in h i s case t o 
j u s t i f y review in the case or reversal of h i s conv ic t ion . 
POINT I I I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION 
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o 
support h i s convict ion of murder in the second degree. He 
a s s e r t s tha t the t e s t imonies of Rickey Myers and E l i Patrick 
Archuleta were too unbel ievable to support a conv ic t ion . 
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When consider!nq a cha l lenge to the i<ul I ii'Jtjrii\ ' '"' . 
idence . support a c o n v i c t i o n , t h i s Com L has applied tin 
I ; i in mi I in in I in in HI i i mi i i i i > , .. • . ' ' j 
This Court w i l l not l i g h t l y overturn the f inding 
of a jury. We must view the evidence properly 
presented at t r i a l in t h e l i g h t most favorable 
to the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t f and w i l l only i n t e r f e r e 
when the evidence i s so lacking and insubstant^ 
that a reasonable man could not poss ib ly have 
reached a v e r d i c t beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We a lso view in a l i g h t most favorable to the 
jury ' s verdic t those f a c t s which can be reasonably 
i n f e r r e d from the evidence p resen ted to i t . 
Sta t t . ju_* MgCai de i j , 11 i il «' i i 'i >n "i it ri (111 > 111 1 ^ H n ( c i t a t i o n & 
o m i t t # * ( 1 ) „ ftnd, e v e n if I  hit r u n in I v i rf I I n i I I I I N M \V In l l l i i i i i 
wholly c o n c l u s i v e «n il \ Mil t adictor y evidence 01 c o n f l i c t i n g 
i in 11 M M i in c e s e x i * I I I  1  v r u i n I ' I i i I  11 11 r in i p I in < • 1 ill S t a t e v . H o w e l l
 f 
649 P.2d 9 1 , °» MM.ih 1982) . !,<,e a l so S t a t e v . Isaacson, 7'M 
P.2d 555 (Utah 1985) „ tinder tlicsi. s t anda rds of review, 
dt 1 en ihi ill "  * i 1111 in i I i i mi ' In in I i I I in 'tl I in i "ii 11 
Defendant was charged with second degree worrier under 
Utah Code Ann § 78-5-203 (1953), as amended. "The p e r t i n e n t 
elements of till: :i<= J: offense a r e tl: :iat tl: ::ie actor : •..•.-. 
(a) :i n t e n t I o n a 1 1 y o r k n o w I n g 1 y c a u s e s 11 I e d e a th 
of another; or 
(c) a c t i n g under c i rcumstances evidencing 
depraved ind i f ference to human l i f e , he 
r e c k l e s s l y engaged in conduct which creates 
a grave r i s k of death t o another and thereby 
••••:•/•' -causes t h e death of ano ther , 
. , , / T h e s e r e q u i s i t e elements wore e s t a b l i s h e d in t h i s case 
a,B t if mi 1 f'liii 'Ml. s /'.. . 
Rickey Myers and the ~"'~'iTn went t o a p a r t y where 
defendant was a l so p re sen t (K# w->r w - , , v 1 2 f 615) • AH Myers a**J 
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the vic t im l e f t the front door defendant pulled a gun from his 
be l t and said "when you see your f r iends over the re , give them 
t h i s , * then defendant shot the vict im in the head with the p i s t o l 
(R. 410, 412). Defendant then turned toward Myers and asked 
•Would you l i k e some of t h i s , too?" (R. 413) . 
The po l i ce , l a t e r t ha t morning, went to defendant 's 
residence t o a r r e s t him, as well as ask quest ions concerning the 
homicide. Officer John Johnson asked and received permission 
from defendant t o search h i s vehic le (R. 479) . Johnson "found 
one l i v e round of .38 ca l iber ammunition in the floorboard" of 
the front passenger side of the vehic le (R. 480) . The bu l l e t had 
a so l id lead slug tha t was unjacketed (R. 480). 
The r e s u l t s of the autopsy performed on the v ic t im, by 
the medical examiner, showed two bu l l e t fragments taken from the 
v ic t im 1 s s k u l l . These two fragments were lead colored, the same 
as a "common lead bu l l e t " (R. 513). Furthermore, defendant and 
the s t a t e s t ipu la t ed to the testimony of Robert D. Baldwin, who 
i s a c r imina l i s t with the Utah Sta te Crime Laboratory, and h i s 
report i s t h a t the fragments found in the v i c t i m ' s head came from 
a .357 or a .38 ca l iber bu l l e t (R. 657). 
In addi t ion t o the autopsy performed by the medical 
examiner, Dr. Richard Sander, he also t e s t i f i e d a t the 
preliminary hearing t h a t the v i c t i m ' s gunshot wound indicated the 
discharge was a t a very close range to the v i c t i m ' s head, perhaps 
" three to four maybe f ive inches away" (R. 563, 575) . Dr. Sander 
also s t a t ed the wound came from "e i ther a .32 or .38 ca l ibe r " gun 
(R. 563, 573-4) . Defendant took the stand and admitted to having 
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b o r r o w e d a .SB c a l i b e r s n u b n o s e p i s t o l from h i t nnphew t o qii 
I iii i in IP I in .ii ir t i I I in in I ii I ill i I I In in in mi mi nil mi II I M i i i " r i m I M f I I D • 
E l i A r c h u l e t a t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e h a p p e n e ill I n "Ibiiiiii i ill n 
d e f e n d a n t a t a ii in IR, 6 in w h o r e d e f e n d a n t 10I1I A r c h u l e t < i III Ii 
in I I I I II III in in mi1! I mi I I mi i in mi mi i II mi i I  mi i l i i i i i t i in In I s o l d h i m
 ( ' " h e 
u s e d a , 3 2 " I F , ^ 6 5 - 6 » , D e f e n d a n t a l s o t o l d A i d m l e t a t h a t i «j 
Ihinl s h o t a b l a c k mail h-> i a i it. c t l i e y w o r e a i q u i n q (I Ii 11 l . 
A r c h u l e t a t e a t if net! t l i a l ilef eirnilant Ii ml I H I H I I I I M (III i IHl iiiiiiiiiliiiii' i 
f r o m A r c h u l e t a p r e v i o u s t o t h e s h o o t i n g IK. 6 6 9 - / 0 ) . The gun 
I h a I f\ i fin 111 e t a i • r 11 i I In 111 f o n d a n I 11 a d I w 11 t y pe s of b u l l e t s , l e a d 
mi 111 j a c Ke t e d i i , b /' J I ... At CIJ LIJ e i a w. i i. 1111k 11 i > t a 1< • i» ir K I I J 1 n \ i 
mill wnr a s k e d i t ho h a d s e e n a b u l l e t ut l i in l i<»il h e f i a e a n d 
in i i"ii u mi i a ri r e p i n e ! "ill . i n r t h e o n e s . " ir f i 7 * n . 
D e f e n d a n t " a a r g u m e n t i s a d d r e s s e d t o t h e w e i g h t a n d 
c r e d i b i l i t y «<f l l i i w i t n e s s e s , n n t fu t h e s u f f i c i e n c y nl t h e i r 
L e s L n n o n j v «• MM | i n I I I  I hi III I I I  IN III VI III I I I I I.I i III Il I  H si rl inn • u c h 
i n s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t ; r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y 
i null iii inn 111 il t \ i p y o m l a l o a r . o n a b l e d o u b t , S t a t e v> W i l s o n , ":>6S 
P.2,1 fif. ( U t a h 1 4 ' M , din1 V . f n l w i t h i n t h e p c i o ^ , . a-i . f 
i h i s I ' o u r t t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s j u d g m e n * I'M " h i t "1 t h e f a c t 
I n le I , " h t a t c v . Lam nil Hie II" 'rl J l M H I i l i i d h 1 9 8 0 ) . T h e 
;j u t \ft rs d e t e r n n na f i o n s h o u l t 
POINT IV 
f:::-,. j THE TRIAL COUKi .. ., \ ^ W I T T I N G 
THE TESTIMONY 01* AN "LE WITNESS, 
CONCERNING THE SAME FACTS GIVEN AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING, TO BE READ INTO THE 
RECORD WHEN DEFENDANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS AT THE 
* PRELIMINARY HEARING. : 
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Defendant claims the t r i a l court erred by allowing the 
preliminary hearing testimony of Dr. Sander, a former a s s i s t a n t 
medical examiner, to be read i n to evidence a t t r i a l . He claims 
i t denied him the r ight to confrontation and cross-examination 
under A r t i c l e l r Section 12 of the Utah Cons t i tu t ion . 
This court should decl ine to reach the mer i ts of t h i s 
issue because i t was not adequately preserved for review below in 
that defense counsel ' s object ion to the in t roduct ion of the 
doc to r ' s preliminary hearing testimony was apparently withdrawn. 
Moreoverf defendant was not denied h i s r ight to confrontation and 
cross-examination under a l l of the f ac t s and circumstances of 
t h i s case where he was accorded the opportunity to cross-examine 
the doctor and other witnesses on a l l material aspects of the 
case r e l a t i n g to Dr. Sander 's testimony both a t the preliminary 
hearing and a t t r i a l . 
Dr. Sanders was an unavailable witness within the x 
meaning of R. 804 of Utah 's Rules of Evidence. That ru l e 
provides t h a t a witness i s una able when "the declarant i s 
absent from the hearing and the proponent of h i s statement has 
been unable to procure h i s attendance by process or other 
reasonable means". Utah R. Evid. Rule 804(a)(5) (Supp. 1985) He 
was an a s s i s t a n t s t a t e medical examiner and had performed the 
autopsy on the vic t im. He was cal led by the Sta te a t the 
defendant 's preliminary hearing to t e s t i f y as t o cause of death, 
size of the gunshot wound, and cal iber of the bu l le t (R. 543). 
He had been subpoenaed by the S t a t e for t r i a l (R. 541) , but he 
was no longer an a s s i s t a n t medical examiner for Utah and had 
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e s t a b l i s h e d h i s res idence and moved t o California (P.. ^41 , c i43) . 
The Staf f - hai l uninrlf1 f "lii i|li! rt 1 h o t e l r e s e r v a t i o n s f o r h im, m ill 
v e i l ! l e d t h a t lit1 h a i l i I.M I I v u d t h e s u b p o e n a i n , "i '1 <' I I  I  a w n i , ill. 
t h e l i n e of t i i a l , L I I L J U L L U L u n e x p e c t e d l y d i d n o t a p p e a r , 
I mi 11 i"i in (" f in I  i wi i ( in "in i In lii I I K "' I -i I i I mi1 I in , i t I I  in in I If, i 'II ' I 
ami when lie wan i i n a i l y i cached by phone in t a i n oi n i a , IHL merely 
s a i d he did not ir esixurid t o the nubpoena because of nHim 
1 ( J 1111(11 II III N i l ' I I I ! Ill III I ill I I ») II III III I l l I I II Ill III I I I III Ill I 1 1 1 111 »l I I III * I III 11 I I III ' 
A11 endance o I Wi1 ne s se s it oni W i I I i c n 11 a S ta t e in € t1 mi m ii 11 
P r o c e e d i n g could have been employed to s e r i n e h i s a t t endance 
(Utah Code iiillll i i i , I i n m ' ' ' I I I 1 '"i" i I I i unentl<-1III 
continuance of the t i i a l would lliayt1 llhnen necessary , and tint t r i a l 
court t h e r e f o u explored othei a l t e r n a t i v e with the p a r t i e s Ik. 
•i4 H , One al le i na t ive would In In decla t t . Llie liuctoi an 
u n a v a i l a b l e w i t n e s s , and in t roduce h i s p re l iminary hear ing 
l e s t n i i i u i y hn h i iM| ii -. I In l i i i i ' l i n i i i l was x i l i s l i e d l h . i t 
d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s t o con f ron ta t i on and cross-examination were 
adequately p r o t e c t e d , • • • •• . -
Tin n w.r 11 I I n i i n n i ,l miii 1 I 111 i in I  Illh1 I  I II o i I I i I 
( S 1 1 p p . 1 9 8 b) ,. w h i e h p r o v i d e s : 
(b) Hearsay excep t ions . The fol lowing a r e not 
excluded by the hear nay rule If the di clarant 
i s unavai l a b l e as a \ > i,I nensi , ,. .. ; 
(1) Former t e s t imony . Testimony given as a 
witness a t another hearing of the same or a 
d i f f e r e n t proceeding f or in a depos i t ion taken 
in comp] iance with law in t h e course of the 
same or another proceeding f i f the party 
against whom the testimony i s now offered, or 
i n a c i v i l ac t ion or p roceed ing , a predecessor 
in i n t e r e s t f had an opportunity and s imi lar 
motive to develop the testimony by d i r e c t , 
cross , or redirect examination. 
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As previously s t a t e d , the doctor had t e s t i f i e d a t the preliminary 
hearing as to cause of death, and "size and ca l iber of the wound" 
(R. 5 4 3 ) . The defense had f u l l opportunity to cross-examine him 
on these matters a t that hearing (R. 543-48) , and these were the 
only matters for which the S t a t e desired t o introduce the prior 
recorded test imony. 
The defense asserted that other matters had ar i sen a t 
t r i a l which n e c e s s i t a t e d further cross-examination of the doctor. 
The court explored what those matters were and determined tha t 
the defense could explore them through other equally e f f i c i e n t 
means. The complete dialogue on t h i s subject went as f o l l o w s : 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : Your Honor, of course 
I would object t o the use of the preliminary 
hearing t ranscr ip t in l i e u of the s t a t e ' s not 
producing the doctor. The reason for that 
i s that in view of testimony by Mr. Myers, 
which i s not the same as I heard at the 
preliminary hearing, I w i l l have new quest ions 
t o ask Dr. Sander. I r e a l i z e the predicament 
that tne s t a t e i s i n , and there i s c r o s s -
examination on the record of Dr. Sander. If 
I could ask Dr. Ryser, Monique Ryser,? 
some ques t ions with respect t o her observat ions , 
then perhaps that may remedy i t . But I 
won't know u n t i l I can ta lk t o her and see 
i f she can answer them. 
, \ 
.^ The Court: Which s p e c i f i c area of inquiry 
are you concerned about? That i s , the proper 
testimony of Dr. Sander at the preliminary 
hearing w i l l have to do, as I understand, 
with the cause of death. You don f t dispute 
that , do you? 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : No. 
The Court: And the s i z e of the wound 
or the ca l iber p o t e n t i a l l y of the s h e l l or 
7 Dr. Ryser was the Utah medical examiner at the time of t r i a l 
and would have been ava i lab le to t e s t i f y . 
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the bullet that entered the head of the 
victim? 
is . Palacios: T c r o s s - e x a m . ied 1: :i n " 
mi mi il f'liR i v e l y on t h a * '" r 
The Court: You were present and .• •£& 
representing the defendant and had an 
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Sander ••'*• 
regarding those two areas of inqui ry; 
d i d Y O U n i t ? ' •' -' .' ; . 
Ms, P a l a c i o s : Yon 
ill"" in Court; : W ha t spe cI f ic a r ea of 
inquiry are you talking about that represents 
a change f i;om tlrie time of the pre], iminary heari i :i 3 1 
Ms. Palacios; Your Honor, fl rst of a l l , this 
would be whether or not there would be any-- if 
there were any tests done with respect to 
gunpowder, stippling, or any other type of 
tests on the hands of the deceased. 
The Court: Is that a change front the '"• - ^ 
prelim inar y hearing? 
Ms. Palacios: Yes, your Honor. 
Myers went up and demonstrated that Mr. Givens 
put his hands up and held his hands on his 
head. That was a demonstration that i.e made 
to the jury. So with that in mindf then 
there's some question as to what injury there 
was to his hands. Also i t appears that the 
s ta te ' s theory, and this is not something that '"••• 
I had, the state did not put Leonard Fernandez 
on the stand, but the state has him say that 
he saw someone sitting up in the middle of the 
entrywayf and apparently the State*s theory 
will be that the body was moved about at—moved 
and fell at some point, The witness1 testimony 
i s that the body was up. The officer testified 
that the body was not. Officer Stevensen was 
not at the preliminary hearing, I won] d ! 1 *.e 
to ask the medical examiner whether or not 
there would be blood shooting outf spraying 
out; at any rate, what the blood splatters 
would be and what type of blood would be 
produced by this type of wound, and if there 
would be evidence on i t . There's also inquiry 
by the prosecution of Mr. Jlyers or of the officers 
with respect to blood spatters on Rickey Myers1 
clothes The officers did not testify at the 
preliminary hearing. That issue was not 
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brought up. So I did not ask him again about 
s p l a t t e r s or what the blood would do. Now— 
The Court: Given the defense in t h i s case , 
the defendant i s claiming that he did not commit 
the crime? 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : That 's correc t . 
The Court: And that he had nothing to do 
with i t ? 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : That 's correc t . 
The Court: Nor did he witness nor was he 
in the v i c i n i t y of the crime? 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : That's correc t . 
The Court: Very w e l l , have you seen the 
autopsy report , Ms. Palac ios? 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : I have seen the autopsy 
report . 
The Court: I s there reference in the 
autopsy report to the quest ion of the res idue 
of the hands, the t e s t of the residue on the 
hands of the v ic t im? 
Ms. P a l a c i o s : There i s no information. 
The Court: Your purpose in proceeding 
with t h i s proffered evidence, Mr. Christensen, 
i s t o lay a foundation for the introduct ion 
of the autopsy report? 
Mr. Christensen: Or j u s t the t r a n s c r i p t , 
your Honor, i t s e l f . I think that e i ther one 
would s u f f i c e . I might i n d i c a t e that for the 
record on page 77 Dr. Sander does ta lk about 
s t i p p l i n g , which i s cons i s t en t with c l o s e range 
of up t o s i x t o e i g h t inches , with a large powder 
s t i p p l i n g s i x to e ight inches acros s , and i t 
says at a very close—and makes very small 
patterns suggest ing two inches to three inches 
t o t a l d i spers ion which would vary with the 
type of gunpowder But apparently there i s 
s t i p p l i n g a t l e a s t on the face where the gunshot 
wound—or the face and the temporal area where 
the gunshot wound took p l a c e . So we do have 
that in the record that i n d i c a t e s t h a t . 
- 3 2 -
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Also, he I n d i c a t e s t h a t t he gunshot did not 
p e n e t r a t e the e n t i r e s k u l l but lodged i n s i d e 
which, you know, makes common sense t h a t we may 
l i m i t the s p a t t e r i n g anyway s ince i t d id not 
e x i t . 
Ms, Pa ] a c I os i I dI dn"' t ki i o«w th a t
 f and 
the ju ry 'might not ki IOW tha t ' • ^ 
Mr • Ch r i st en se n: B it it cue r t a I nl y Monique 
Ryser i s q u a l i f i e d ai id 1 las clone c lose t e s t i n g 
of s t i p p l i n g p a t t e r n s and t h i n g s l i k e t h a t . 
In f a c t , if Ms* P a l a c i o s wanted to use he r j u s t 
as If she was cross-examining her ( t h a t would 
be f i n e , and a,
 : .k her whatever she wants t o . 
The Coui t : You mean for Ms. P a l a c i o s t o 
c a ] ] D i: • Ry" s e i: :i n 1: i e i: c a s e i n c h i e f ? 
Mr. C h r i s t e n s e n : If she won;] d ] :i ke t o , 
Tl :ie Cour t : Well , Counsel , ny view a t t h i s 
poin t i s t h a t in l i g h t of t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of Dr. Sander, t h a t t he a l t e r n a t e proposal wi th 
regard t o l a y i n g a foundat ion t o in t roduce t h e 
tes t imony given by Dr. Sander a t the p re l imina ry 
hea r ing i s an a p p r o p r i a t e method of handl ing 
t h i s a spec t of proof. I do not see from the 
s ta tement of t h e defense or t he p o s i t i o n of 
the defense t h a t the defendant had nothinc t c-
do with t h i s cr ime, as unduly p r e j u d i c i n g 
defendant i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t he two 
e lements involved h e r e , mostly t he cause M 
death and the s i z e of t h e wound. I t appears t o 
me from what you have s t a t e d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n 
of the s t i p p l i n g or the blood spray was an 
i s s u e t h a t was gone i n t o a t t h e p re l imina ry 
h e a r i n g , and t h e r e f o r e , I am going to g ran t ] ; • ::: i in: 
r e q u e s t , Mr. C h r i s t e n s e n . C e r t a i n l y , Ms. 
P a l a c i o s , i f you deem i t necessary and 
a p p r o p r i a t e , I suppose t h a t you can have 
Dr. Ryser appear dur ing your case in c h i e f . 
But s h o r t of t h a t , I see no undue p re jud ice t o 
the defendant by al lowing t h i s method of proof 
as t o these e lements of t h e cr ime. 
Ms. p a i a c i o s . okay, your Honor, t h a t 
bei ng t h e c a s e , then I would r eques t a t l e a s t 
] 5 i l lnutes before I ca l 1 -bef ore I t a l k t o 
Dr. Ry s e r . 
(R. 543-54 8 ) . 
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The record does not i n d i c a t e that defendant ever c a l l e d 
Dr. Ryser nor was she used as a witness by defendant* 
The court was of the view that Dr. Fyser could have 
answered defendant's add i t iona l quest ions (R. 544-47) . The court 
a l s o was not overly persuaded that the added testimony would have 
helped further the defendant's defense that he did not commit the 
o f fense . The Court observed t h a t , "I do not see from the 
statement of the defense or the p o s i t i o n of the defense that the 
defendant had nothing t o do with t h i s crime, as unduly 
prejudicing the defendant in the establ ishment of the two 
elements involved here, mostly the cause of death and the s i z e of 
the wound." (R. 548) . 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant was given adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Sander on a l l matters for which 
h i s prior testimony was offered at t r i a l . Rule 804 (b)(1) was 
f u l l y complied wi th , and there was no error in admitting the 
prior test imony. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convic t ion should be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s _£J_2day of August, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^ f c £ 7? ^ W ^ ^ X - 7v?7— 
EARL F. DORIUS & ^ ' 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
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Appellant's motion to remand, hauing been considered, 
it is hereby ordered that the same be, and hereby is, denied 
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a K 0
 County, u*3h 
INSTRUCTION NO • S± 
The Court wishes to suggest a few thoughts which you may 
desire to consider in your deliberations, along with the evidence 
in the case# and all the instructions previously given. 
This is an important case. The trial has been expensive 
in time, and effort, and money, to both the defense and the 
prosecution. If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the 
case is left open and undecided. Like all cases, it must be 
disposed of some time. There appears no reason to believe that 
another trial would not be costly to both sides. Nor does there 
appear any reason to believe that the case can be tried again, 
by either side, better or more exhaustively than it has been 
tried before you. Any future jury must be selected in the same 
manner and from the same source as you have been chosen. So, 
there appears no reason to believe that the case would ever 
be submitted to eight men and women more conscientious, more 
impartial, or more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer 
evidence could be produced on behalf of either side. 
Of course these things suggest themselves, upon brief re-
flection, to all of* us who have sat through this trial. The 
only reason they are mentioned now is because some of them may 
have escaped your attention, which must have been fully occupied 
up to this time in reviewing the evidence in the case. They 
are matters which, along with other and perhaps more obvious 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page Two 
ones, remind us how desirable it is that you unanimously agree 
upon a verdict. 
As stated in the instructions given at the time the case 
was submitted to you for decision, you should not surrender 
your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of evidence, 
solely because of the opinion of other jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
However, it is your duty as jurors to consult with one 
another, and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, 
if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each 
of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do 
so only after a consideration of * the evidence in the case with 
your fellow jurors. And in the course of your deliberations, 
you should not hesitate to reexamine your own views, and change 
your opinion, if convinced it is erroneous. 
\ In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, you 
must examine the questions submitted to you with candor and 
frankness, and with proper deference to and regard for the opinions 
•» 
of each other. That is to say, in conferring together, each 
of you should pay due attention and respect to the views of 
the others, and listen to each other's arguments with a disposition 
to reexamine your own views. 
If much the greater number of you are for a conviction, 
each dissenting juror ought to consider whether a doubt in his 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page Three 
or her own mind is a reasonable one# since it makes no effective 
impression upon the minds of so many equally honest, equally 
conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same responsibility, 
serve under the same oath, and have heard the same evidence 
with, we may assume, the same attention and an equal desire 
to arrive at the truth. On the other hand, if a majority or 
even a lesser number of you are for acquittal, other jurors 
ought seriously to ask themselves again, and most thoughtfully, 
whether they do not have reason to doubt the correctness of 
a judgment, which is not concurred in by many of their fellow 
jurors, and whether they should, not distrust the weight and 
sufficiency of evidence, which fails to convince the minds of 
several of their fellows beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You are not partisans. You are judges — judges of the 
facts. Your sole interest here is to seek the truth from the 
evidence in the case. You are the exclusive judges of the credi-
bility of all the witnesses, and of the weight and effect of 
all the evidence. .* 
Remember, at all times, that no juror is expected to yield 
a conscientious conviction he or she may have as to the weight 
or effect of evidence. But remember also that, after full delibera-
tion and consideration of all the evidence in the case, it is 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page Four i 
your duty to agree upon a verdict, if you can do so without 
violating your individual judgment and your conscience. Remember 
too, if the evidence in the case fails to establish guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the accused should have your unanimous verdict 
of not guilty. 
In order to make a decision more practicable, the law imposes 
the burden of proof on one party or the other, in all cases. 
In the present case, the burden of proof is on the state. 
Above all, keep constantly in mind that, unless your final 
conscientious appraisal of the evidence in the case clearly 
requires it, the accused should never be exposed to the risk 
of having to run twice the gauntlet of a criminal prosecution; 
and to endure a second time the mental, emotional and financial 
strain of a criminal trial. 
You may conduct your deliberations as you choose, but I 
suggest that you now carefully reexamine and reconsider all 
the evidence in the case bearing upon the questions before you. 
You may now retire and continue your deliberations, in 
such manner as shall be determined by your good and conscientious 
judgment as reasonable men and women. 
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ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury S 5.4 reads as 
follows: 
5.4 Length of de l ibe ra t ions ; deadlocked ju ry . 
(a) Before the jury r e t i r e s for de l ibera-
t ion , the court may give an ins t ruc t ion which 
informs the ju ry : 
(i) t h a t in order to re turn a ve rd ic t , 
each juror must agree the re to ; 
( i i ) t h a t ju rors have a duty to consult 
with one another and to de l ibe ra te with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if i t can be 
done without violence to individual judgment; 
( i i i ) t h a t each juror must decide the 
case for himself, but only after an impart ial 
consideration of the evidence with h i s fellow j u r o r s ; 
(iv) t h a t in the course of de l ibe ra t ions , 
a juror should not h e s i t a t e to re-examine h i s 
own views and change h is opinion i f convinced 
i t i s erroneous; and 
(v) t h a t no juror should surrender h i s 
honest conviction as to the weight or effect 
of the evidence solely because of the opinion 
of h i s fellow j u r o r s , or for the mere purpose 
of returning a ve rd i c t . 
(b) If i t appears to the court tha t the jury has been unable to agree, the court may 
require the jury to continue the i r de l ibera t ions 
and may give or repeat an ins t ruc t ion as 
provided in subsection (a) . 
(c) The jury may be discharged without 
having agreed upon a verd ic t if i t appears 
tha t there i s no reasonable probabi l i ty of 
\ agreement. 
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